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CASE NOTE
Sherman Act—Statutory Construction—Partnerships and Partner Li-
ability—Western Laundry and Linen Rental Co. v. United States.' —
The defendant partnership, Western Laundry and Linen Rental Co.
(Western), and one Hazan, a partner in Western, were indicted in
1968, together with five corporations and four individuals, for a crim-
inal violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' All of the defendants
entered pleas of nolo contendere,' and all were convicted and fined by
the Federal District Court for Neveda. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with two issues: (1)
whether a partnership is a "person" as contemplated by the Sherman
Act and, therefore, indictable under that Act; and (2) whether the
indictment of a partnership and one of its partners for an antitrust
violation is contrary to the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy.' A unanimous court, delivering three separate opinions,
HELD: that a partnership is subject to indictment as a "person"
within the meaning of that word as contained in the Sherman Act, and
that the defendant Hazan could be fined as an individual, distinct from
the partnership entity. The concurring opinions, however, divided on
the rationale pertaining to the separate liability of a partner. It is the
purpose of this note to examine and evaluate the statutory construction
techniques contained in the opinions. It will be concluded that, al-
though the holding of the court is probably correct, the faulty reasoning
has materially altered the precedent value of the decision.
The court of appeals was faced with the threshold question of
whether a partnership can be indicted for a violation of the Sherman
Act, which provides in part that any "person" engaging in practices
considered to be in restraint of trade may be criminally prosecuted.'
The Sherman Act, while containing an internal definition of "person"
to include "corporations and associations,"° makes no specific reference
to partnerships.
In its opinion, the court, apparently considering the word "associ-
424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
2
 15 U.S.C.	 1 (1964).
a This note will not deal with the question raised as to the waiver of rights by a plea
of nolo contendere. This would be collateral to the discussion of the essential holding of
Western, and has been more than adequately treated by many authors. Sec generally
Seamans, Winson and McCarthy, Use of Criminal Pleas in Aid of Private Antitrust
Actions, 3 Duquesne U. L. Rev. 167 (1965); Note, Nolo Pleas in Antitrust Cases, 79
Ilarv. L. Rev. 1475 (1966).
4 U.S. Const, amend. V.
5 15 U.S.C. 0 1 (1964),
a 15 U.S.C.
	 7 (1964) states:
The word "person," or "persons," whenever used in sections 1-7 of this title
shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or au-
thorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories,
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
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ations" in the Sherman Act definition of "person" to be ambiguous
as to whether it included partnerships, looked to the general construc-
tion rule of the United States Code.? Although this method of inter-
pretation may indeed be valid in many instances, especially where a
particular statute does not define its own terms, resort to the general
rules of construction may not be completely valid where Congress
has made an attempt to define a specific term. 8 Since Congress has
attempted to define the same term for the limited use within the Sher-
man Act, the court may have overlooked an important aspect of the
Act, the specific intent of Congress regarding the coverage of its pro-
vision.' By finding that partnerships are not within the definition of
"person" contained in the Sherman Act, the court in Western has in
effect superimposed a general rule of construction upon the Sherman
Act, without considering what entities Congress intended to include
within the definition provided for antitrust acts," when several more
appropriate statutory construction techniques were available for use
by the court.
The court found authority for its statutory interpretation in
United States v. A & P Trucking Co. 11 It can be seriously questioned,
however, whether the Western court interpreted that case correctly.
In A & P Trucking, the Supreme Court read the general definition of
"person" as found in the general construction section into a criminal
provision of the Transportation of Explosives Act.' But there, unlike
the present case, the Act contained no internal definition of "person."
The court merely applied mechanically, and correctly, the general
rule of statutory construction. It should be noted further that the
A & P Trucking Court was construing the word "whoever," 'which
word shares the same definition of "person" in the Rules of Construc-
tion Section of the Code." The applicability of such a holding to the
construction problem facing the court in Western must, therefore, be
seriously questioned.
United States v. Brookman Co. 14 provides the strongest precedent
7 424 F.2d at 443. The current general construction rule provides in part that the
term "person" shall "include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
8
 "[T]he legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption . .. that if
change occurs in legislative language, a change was intended in legislative result." United
States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 155 (ND. Calif. 1967), citing J.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4510 (3d ed. 1943).
9
 See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958): "In matters of statutory con-
struction the duty of this Court is to give effect to the intent of Congress, and in doing so
our first reference is of course to the literal meaning of the words employed."
For example, the Clayton Act adopted the same definition of "person" as that
found in the Sherman Act. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
11 .358 U.S. 121 (1958).
12
 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1964). The Act has since been amended to include a definition
of "person" which encompasses partnerships. Id. at § 831.
18 1 U.S.C. 1 (1964). 358 U.S. at 123.
14 229 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1964). This decision arose out of a motion to dismiss
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for the inclusion of a partnership within the Sherman Act definition of
"person." In Brookman, the District Court for the Northern District
of California held that a partnership is a "person" within the Sherman
Act, and, therefore, is subject to prosecutions under that Act." Al-
though that case also relied upon A & P Trucking, it noted that the
Transportation of Explosives Act contained no internal definition
section," a distinction that the Western court neglected to draw. This
would seem to lead to a conclusion that the Western court's line of
reasoning contains flaws which notably mar the decision. The holding
as to the liability of a partnership in an antitrust action may indeed
be the correct one, but, as precedent, this case will remain tainted by
the court's questionable statutory construction technique.
However, the finding that partnerships are indeed indictable
under a definition of "person" within the Sherman Act may be sub-
stantiated by the application of at least three different statutory argu-
ments that could have been pursued. First, "associations" is the key
term in the examination of the Sherman Act definition for construction
purposes. 17 Congress could have used the term "associations" in the
common law sense, as a generic word broad enough to encompass
partnerships." In addition, the three important antitrust statutes do
not treat the term "association" with any symmetry of meaning. The
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act do not define the term, and the
Federal Trade Commission Act" includes the term "associations"
within its definition of "corporations" 2° and treats partnerships as a
separate entity together with corporations and persons." However, the
term "associations" has been statutorily defined to include partnerships
in the antitrust section of the Export Trade Promotion Act 22 which
extends the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act to the
field of export or foreign trade. Since this Act is of most recent vintage,
a pattern of increasing specificity as to a definition of the term can be
drawn from these four statutes. It could be argued that one definition
of the term should be recognized, if only for the sake of consistency in
the federal antitrust laws.
Secondly, the Sherman Act's definition of "person" states that the
term shall "include corporations and associations."" The
 word "in-
brought by a partnership which had been indicted under the same section as involved in
the Western case.
15
 Id. at 864.
is Id. at 863.
17 The Brookman court recognized this factor when it concluded that neither
"person" nor "association" was intended in a limited sense that would exclude partner-
ships from the scope of the criminal penalty provisions of the Sherman Act. 229 F. Supp.
at 684.
is United States v. Martindale, 146 F. 280, 284 (D. Kan. 1903); Thomas v. Dakin,
22 Wend. 9, 104 (N.Y. 1839).
to 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1964).
20 15 U.S.C. Q 44 (1964).
21 15 U.S.C. { 45 (1964).
22 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1964).
28 See note 6 supra.
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dude" is usually considered a term of enlargement, and not of limita-
tion." By prefacing the definition with such a word, it may be
concluded that Congress intended the terms that follow to be other
than definitive of all possible parties covered by the Act. 25
 Also, use
of the term "associations" in conjunction with the term "corporations"
could be considered the limits of the intended congressional reach,
corporations being one of the most organized business forms and
associations being one of the least formalized. Thus, partnerships fall
within the range of business forms that Congress intended to reach in
the Sherman Act.
As a third possible construction technique, the phrase "existing
under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws
of any Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign
country," at the end of the Sherman Act definition of "person,"
presents one of the strongest arguments for the inclusion of partner-
ships within the Act. The phrase, modifying the word "associations,"
seems to limit the word by setting aside a particular type of associa-
tion, those recognized by law, and makes only those responsible for
antitrust violations. Since a partnership is defined as an association
under the Uniform Partnership Act," a strong argument 27 exists,
therefore, that it is an "association existing under or authorized by the
laws" of the state." The mere fact that the Congress employed such
language would indicate an intention that the statute be applied to all
new organizations recognized by law.
The inclusion of partnerships within an antitrust statute, however,
can be viewed as a judicial expansion of a criminal statute. The basic
argument is that if Congress did not specifically provide for the indict-
ment of partnerships, the court cannot now expand the criminal scope
of the statute to include partnerships." This contention, however, is
ill-founded. Although it may be true that as a general rule penal stat-
utes should be strictly construed, courts generally approach the whole
problem with a more balanced view. A statute cannot be interpreted
"so narrowly as to defeat its obvious intent.""
Statutes, including penal enactments, are not inert exercises
in literary composition. They are instruments of government,
and in construing them "the general purpose is a more impor-
24 Argosy, Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968).
25 "Canons of statutory construction in particular are often useful only as a crude
guide to legislative intent." District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
20 Uniform Partnership Act § 2 (1966).
27
 See United States v. Brookman Co., 229 F. Supp. 862, 863 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
28 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 87.060(1) (1931): "A partnership is an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
29 Brief for Appellant at 19, Western Laundry and Linen Co. v. United States, 424
F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970), citing the opinion of Chief justice Marshall in United States
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 93 (1820).
BO United States v. Braverman, 373 U.S. 405, 408 (1963).
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tant aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or for-
mal logic may lay down.""
The more valid approach then would be that of ascertaining the intent
of the framers rather than the application of a rigid, mechanical rule
of construction." Even in the closely guarded area of penal statutes,
including the Sherman Act, the intent of Congress should prevail over
the most stringent rule of statutory construction."
However, the true intent of Congress, as determined from the
initial legislative history of the Act, has long since been muddled by
the elaborate revisions of the original bill, the vagaries of statements
of its authors, and the passage of time. A very early case recognized
the difficulty of discerning anything meaningful from the congressional
debates:
Looking simply at the history of the bill from the time it was
introduced in the Senate until it was finally passed, it would
be impossible to say what were the views of a majority of the
members of each house in relation to the meaning of the
act . . . . All that can be determined from the debates and
reports is that various members had various views, and we
are left to determine the meaning of this act, as we determine
the meaning of other acts, from the language used therein."
Therefore, any attempt to ascertain the intent of Congress as to the
criminal limits of the Act must be futile.
Where the intent of Congress is unclear regarding the specific
use of its own language, courts have attempted to discern this intent
by concentrating on the "particular evils at which the legislation was
aimed."" The attempt at generality in the statute was probably inten-
tional. The Act "does not go into detailed definitions which might
either work injury to legitimate enterprise, or through particulariza-
tion defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for escape!"ae The very
fact of the sweeping inclusion of various entities was "thought impor-
tant to preclude any narrow interpretation,"" and should guide the
court to look upon the generic "associations" with some judicial cre-
ativity.
The court in Western might well have taken note of the "rule of
reason" which was enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,"
81
 United States v. Shirley, 359 U.S. 255, 260 (1959).
82
 Cf. 229 F. Supp. at 864.
88
 In Sherwood v. United States, 112 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1940), the court of appeals
held that even in the face of New York's General Construction Law, N.Y. Gen. Con-
struction Law 37 (McKinney 1951), words of a statute "depend upon the legislature's
intent under the circumstances." Id. at 594.
84
 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
85
 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940).
80
 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
81
 United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S 600, 607 (1941).
88
 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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for a standard of interpretation of the Sherman Act. In that case, the
Court applied "the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the charac-
ter" included within the Sherman Act." "This rule . . . draws the line
between zones of legal and illegal conduct under the anti-trust laws
by consideration of all of the factors and circumstances in any given
situations."4° Although the rule of reason is in reality a construction
of the general language of the Act, it is an indication of the need for
judicial interpretation of a vague and open-ended statute. One may
even argue that the very fact such a bill was enacted indicated a con-
gressional intent that courts should use some creativity in construing
the statute. The indictment of partnerships under the Sherman Act
can thus be accomplished by a broad judicial reading of the definition,
utilizing the intent of Congress that such matters should be left within
the preserve of the courts. But such a determination should not be
left to the highly mechanical approach of the court in Western.
It may be possible to delineate somehow the intent of Congress
regarding the ability of the government to indict a partnership for a
Sherman Act violation. However, the court's finding and reasoning
that the partners may be individually indicted and fined is more
difficult to utilize as sound precedent. The court again examined the
A & P Trucking decision'1
 as precedent for holding the partner liable
individually, and its opinion again seems open to serious question. 42
In attempts to interpret the A & P Trucking decision, the court of
appeals stated:
The court there held simply that a partnership could violate
certain regulatory statutes even if the individual partners did
not participate in or have knowledge of the violations . . . .
In such an instance the fine levied on the partnership should
not be collected from the partners' individual assets."
The setting in Western is markedly different. In Western, a partner
was indicted in his individual capacity, while in A & P Trucking there
was never any question of the personal guilt or liability of an individual
partner" since no partner was separately indicted. Therefore, the
question of double jeopardy, or more properly double punishment, was
never before the Supreme Court.
A & P Trucking, therefore, can serve only as the legal conclusion
that the Western court should have drawn. That former case stands
only for the proposition that under the circumstances, Congress in-
so Id. at 60.
40 Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46, 53 (8th Cir. 1958).
41 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958).
42
 Note that Judge Hufstedter, concurring separately, seriously questioned the
expansion of A & P Trucking to rationalize the indictment and punishment of a partner
where his partnership is also a named defendant. 424 F.2d at 445.
48 Id,
44 358 U.S. at 127.
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tended the particular statute to contain a direction that partnerships
be considered entities. The passage, "the conviction of the partnership
cannot be used to punish the individual partners,"" was merely the
A & P Trucking Court's dictum," and referred only to the contingency
of fining a partner when a recovery from the partnership proved im-
possible.4 T
Instead of looking to A & P Trucking for the sole controlling
authority, the Western court, it is submitted, should have examined
other precedent, in particular United States v. Wise." In this case,
the Supreme Court held that a corporate officer is included within the
Sherman Act definition of "person," and that such officer is subject
to liability under Section 1 of the Act. The Court found, however, that
it had to make a special determination as to the penalizing of an indi-
vidual, separate from his business organization or association. The
Court noted:
[Wje attribute no significance to the specific inclusion of
corporations in the definition of persons in determining
whether a corporate officer is within the term .. . [W]e
construe § 1 of the Sherman Act in its common-sense mean-
ing to apply to all officers who have a responsible share in the
proscribed transaction."
Once the court in Western decided that the partnership was in-
deed subject to indictment, that it is in fact an entity unto itself," the
conclusion that the partner was also separately chargeable and punish-
able could have been based on the Wise rationale. Indeed, it could
then be maintained that the partner held a position analogous to the
corporate officer for antitrust purposes, and, consequently, is liable
separately for antitrust violations.
in conclusion, it is suggested that the holding in Western is an
example of somehow arriving at one's destination by taking the wrong
route. The court's use of the standard and narrow rules of statutory
construction can hardly be considered as an enlightened, creative ap-
proach to the problem of interpretation of a broad antitrust statute.
Therefore, any use of Western as precedent should be done with the
caveat that the court's use of the rules of statutory construction must
remain at least questionable.
The court's findings, however, that partnerships are included
45 Id .
40 424 F.2d at 445 (concurring opinion).
47 Id.
48
 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
4tr Id. at 409.
80
 A detailed analysts of the whole problem of the utility of either the aggregate or
entity theories of partnerships is not necessary here. This has been sufficiently discussed.
See Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an
Entity?, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 377 (1963); see also Note, The Partnership as a Legal Entity,
41 Colum. L. Rev. 698 (1941).
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within the scope of the Sherman Act, and that the individual partners
are to be held separately indictable can be justified by either a correct
construction of the rather expansive language of the statute or by re-
course to the intent of the authors of the original act. To find otherwise
would be to use a "construction that is not interpretation, but perver-
sion."51
RAYMOND M. RIPPLE
al Holmes, J, in United States v. Pulaski Co., 243 U.S. 97, 106 (1917).
1004
